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ABSTRACT  
 
This study has been prompted by the recent introduction of the JSE Alternative 
Exchange in South Africa, an alternative listing platform for smaller companies 
compared to the more established JSE Main Board Exchange. This new era has led 
to information asymmetry among current and prospective investors regarding the 
risk-return profile of the companies listed on the relatively new JSE Alternative 
Exchange and how this profile relates to the profile of firms listed on the long 
established JSE Main Board Exchange. In an attempt to fill the above information 
gap, this study sheds light on the short, medium and long-term performances of initial 
public offerings of companies listed on the JSE Alternative Exchange vis-a-vis that of 
JSE Main Board Exchange. This information is relevant for investment and financing 
decision making, principally for investors, venture capitalists and entrepreneurs.  
 
The findings of this research appear to be contrary to expectations and to corporate 
finance theory. The results indicate that on average, initial public offerings by larger 
JSE Main Board companies outperform the smaller JSE Alternative Exchange 
companies on a nominal and risk-adjusted bases in the short-medium and long-term. 
It must be noted however that the differences in performance are not statistically 
significant. On the other hand, in line with documented evidence in the literature, it 
was found that the risk of returns on the smaller capitalisation JSE Alternative 
Exchange companies was indeed higher than that of the JSE Main Board 
companies. A similarity identified between the average performances of the two 
listing platforms is that, the returns for companies decreased overtime between the 
short and long-term. This may be partly due to the impact of the 2007 economic 
recession. 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Context of the study 
As a result of the need to provide an additional exit method for venture capital 
investors, improve access to capital, liquidity and the profile of small companies 
which could not meet Johannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE) Main Board listing 
requirements, the JSE Alternative Exchange (JSE Alt-X) was formed in 2003. The 
JSE Alt-X was formed to provide small to medium sized companies a public listing 
option without conditions which are as stringent as the ones for the JSE Main Board. 
The fact that initial public offerings (IPOs) are the most lucrative exit mechanism for 
venture capital investors (Gerke and Mager, 2006), among other mechanisms, has 
led to a significant increase in IPOs and public listings to-date.  
 
Studies on the long-term performance of IPOs have been conducted in many 
countries globally (25 countries by Loughran et al, 1994). There has been empirical 
evidence of short-run underpricing, market timing around periods of high stock 
market levels and long-run underperformance. A lot of literature is available on IPOs 
in leading economies such as the USA, Japan, UK and Germany (Young and Zaima, 
1988; Gompers and Lerner, 2001; Loughran et al, 1994; Gerke and Ferdinand, 
2006). A fair degree of work has been done on long-term post-listing IPO 
performance for different periods in South Africa as well (M’kombe, 2000 [for period 
1980 to 1998]; Boles, 2001 [for period 1997 and 1998] and Moodley, 2009 [for the 
period 1998 to 2007]).  
 
Moodley’s (2009) work focused more on whether the value of the premium offered by 
IPOs on the close of trade on the first day of issuance indicates the aftermarket 
performance of IPOs between 1998 and 2007 on the JSE in South Africa, with the 
consideration of various role players in the market-place and their respective 
objectives. A study on the aftermarket performance of IPOs by small capitalisation 
companies on the JSE between 1997 and 1998 by Boles (2001) sought to 
understand the factors that affected the aftermarket performance of small 
capitalisation companies listed on the JSE during the period. M’kombe (2000) in his 
study on aftermarket price performance of IPOs on the JSE for the period 1980 to 
1998 sought to establish if IPOs provide abnormal returns, if returns depend on 
investment holding period and the IPO process characteristics.    
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This research seeks to develop on these works, with a particular focus on comparing 
the short, medium and long-term performance of IPOs of companies listed on the 
JSE Main Board and JSE Alt-X between January 2004 and June 2007. In this study 
the short-term is defined as the first 30 calendar days from listing, the medium term is 
the period up to 365 days from the listing date and the long term is the period of 2 
years from the listing date. This will be useful to investors in decision making 
regarding investing in IPOs as well as managing short, medium and long-term return 
expectations on both JSE listing platforms. It will also assist venture capitalists and 
entrepreneurs with information regarding return and financing benefits of IPOs.   
 
The JSE Alt-X is used as a case in point. The JSE Alt-X was introduced in 2003 to 
facilitate the listing of smaller companies in an environment of less strict listing rules 
compared to the JSE Main Board. Table 1 below depicts a summarised comparison 
of the listing criteria for the two listing platforms (Firer et al, 2008): 
 
Criteria JSE Main Board JSE AltX 
Minimum capital R25 million R2 million 
Minimum number of shares 25 million Not prescribed  
Profit history Satisfactory three 
year audited  profit 
history 
Projected profit 
for next two 
years  
Public shareholders: 
- % of each class of shares 
- Number of ordinary shareholders 
- Number of preference shareholders 
 
20% 
500 
50 
 
10% 
100 
Not prescribed 
Minimum listing price 100 cents Not prescribed 
Table 1: JSE listing criteria  
 
The JSE AltX thus caters for a segment of the market which would normally have 
found it difficult to list on the JSE Main Board. These may be perceived as riskier 
IPOs. This study will provide evidence on how they perform on a nominal as well as 
risk-adjusted return bases compared to JSE Main Board IPOs.     
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1.2 Purpose of the study 
The objective of this study is to analyse the short, medium and long-term 
performance of JSE Alt-X IPOs in South Africa between 2004 and 2007. This is done 
in comparison to the larger JSE Main Board IPOs in order to establish which one 
offers higher nominal and risk-adjusted returns to investors and to establish any 
similarities or differences between IPOs on the two JSE listing platforms.  
1.2.1 Research questions 
The following research questions, accordingly, flow from the mentioned essence of 
the study: 
Primary research question: 
1. Do JSE Main Board IPOs outperform JSE Alt-X IPOs in the short, medium or 
long-term on a nominal return basis? 
 
Secondary research questions: 
1. Do JSE Main Board IPOs outperform JSE Alt-X IPOs in the short, medium or 
long-term on a risk-adjusted basis? 
2. Does JSE Alt-X IPO return performance resemble or differ from that of JSE 
Main Board in the short, medium and long term? 
1.2.2 Hypotheses 
i. H0: The JSE Main Board IPOs perform the same as JSE Alt-X IPOs in 
short, medium or long-term on a nominal return basis; H0: u1,t=u2,t. 
ii. Ha: JSE Main Board IPOs do not perform the same as JSE Alt-X IPOs in 
the short, medium or long-term on a nominal return basis. 
 
The primary research question is addressed by the hypothesis or significance test 
and the secondary research questions are addressed by other empirical evidence 
presented in the results chapter 4 of this study.   
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1.3 Problem statement 
The relatively recent introduction of the JSE Alt-X Exchange has meant that there is 
insufficient information about the short, medium and long-run nominal or risk-
adjusted return performance of the stocks listed thereon compared to the long 
established JSE Main Board Exchange. This hampers informed decision making by 
relevant stakeholders including investors, venture capitalists and entrepreneurs. 
Therefore, the study that attempts to provide this vital missing set of information 
would be an important endeavour.  
1.4 Significance of the study 
The study fills a gap in that it gives investors, venture capitalists, entrepreneurs and 
other relevant stakeholders a new informative perspective on short, medium and 
long-term nominal and risk-adjusted return offered by JSE Alt-X IPOs (small 
capitalisation companies) compared to JSE Main Board (predominantly larger 
capitalisation companies) IPOs. 
1.5 Limitations 
i. The study focuses mainly on South Africa’s JSE IPOs. 
ii. The study focuses on IPOs, with limited reference to other listing techniques.   
iii. The study is for a limited time period of January 2004 to June 2007, for up to 2 
years per IPO counter. This may therefore reflect the impact of the financial 
market crisis which coincidentally is deemed to have started in July 2007. 
iv. There are limitations in the availability of data for the entire period of analysis 
for all IPO counters. Some counters are excluded for lack of data. 
v. Dividends as a measure of investment performance and trading costs are 
ignored. 
vi. Holding Period Return (HPR) performance was based on daily closing prices 
and average HPR from date of listing are calculated for short, medium and long 
term periods, respectively. 
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1.6 Outline of the study 
The study’s outline is as follows: 
i. Firstly, this preceding introduction provides a background and review of IPOs in 
South Africa, the JSE Alt-X and JSE Main Board Exchanges. 
ii. Secondly, follows the literature review and a summary of its apparent findings. 
This includes the review of publications including journals, theses and papers 
reflecting the work that has already been conducted on post-IPOs in South 
Africa and internationally. This assisted in highlighting the identified areas which 
need further research work or the gap that exists in this area of research.  
iii. Thirdly, the paper lays out the research methodology utilised in the analysis of 
the data and information of the study, including the significance testing. 
iv. Fourth, this next section covers results of the study. 
v. Finally, conclusions are drawn from the empirical results obtained with respect 
to the initial objectives of the study.     
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter contains a summary of the literature review around listings, post IPO 
performance and related issues in South Africa and internationally. The literature 
review is used to gain further understanding of various segments of the broad 
research area of IPOs. The review is instrumental in identifying the specific area of 
IPOs which requires further research. The review covers the following thematic 
segments of IPOs:  
- IPO among competing going public mechanisms; 
- Objectives and attributes of a successful IPO; 
- IPO listing processes, contractual mechanisms and characteristics; 
- Factors affecting post IPO performance; 
- Short to long-term IPO aftermarket performances. 
2.1 IPO among competing going-public mechanisms 
An IPO is a company’s first equity issue to the public (Firer et al, 2008). The fact that 
IPOs are the most lucrative exit mechanism for venture capital investors (Gerke and 
Mager, 2006), among other mechanisms, has led to a significant increase in IPOs 
and public listings to-date. A study by Gleason et al (2005), details other methods of 
going public besides the popular traditional IPO, namely reserve takeover or reverse 
merger and self-underwritten IPO. Some of the justifications given for pursuing the 
above methods of going public instead of the conventional IPO include strong 
criticism for potential for conflict of interest in terms of biased allocation of shares and 
the extent of underpricing by underwriting investment banks. It is not essential to 
engage an underwriting investment bank if alternative methods are utilised to go 
public. A reverse takeover or reverse merger entails the reverse acquisition of a 
public listed company by a private company. Under the self-underwritten IPO, the 
listing firm can manage the underwriting of their own IPO. 
 
According to Gleason et al (2005), “A reverse takeover is a technique that allows a 
privately held company to obtain a listing on a public exchange without doing an IPO. 
The private firm (called the target) is acquired by a publicly traded firm, referred to as 
the vehicle, or the ‘acquirer’, or the shell. Following the acquisition, the management 
of the privately held company usually replaces the management of the vehicle, and 
the surviving entity is the new public firm, previously the private ‘target’. As the public 
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firm, the target can raise capital through public markets, but the transaction itself 
does not raise capital for the firm, in contrast to most IPOs (whether self-underwritten 
or not). The primary reason that the firm uses the technique is to go public. Thus the 
reverse takeover process is a corporate combination (i.e., an acquisition) rather than 
an IPO. The private firm’s management seeks an appropriate public vehicle, 
arranges for the public vehicle to make a bid where payment is in stock or cash and 
stock, completes the transaction, and files for a corporate combination with the 
Securities Exchange Commission, as in any other acquisition.”    
 
Some of the reasons why a reverse merger can be preferred to a traditional IPO 
(Gleason et al, 2005) are that:  
- it can be completed in a shorter period of between one and six months 
compared to six to eighteen months for the traditional IPO; 
- it is a simple way of going public; 
- can be significantly cheaper because of no need for underwriting and can be 
done by less expensive boutique financial advisors; 
- the advantage of knowing accurate valuations before transaction conclusion; 
- the method can avoid the disadvantages associated with market sentiment; 
- it involves less regulatory scrutiny such as less stringent requirements for 
provision of extensive financial information. 
 
However, to the contrary, the following factors work against reverse takeovers: 
- Lack of the underwriter’s share price stabilisation leads to greater price 
volatility (Ritter, 1987); 
- The companies that go public through reverse takeovers tend to have high 
gearing, low profitability and low balance sheet liquidity. They also exhibit 
lower share liquidity, high volatility and relatively lower institutional ownership 
(Gleason et al, 2005);   
- Firms are generally small and likely to fail within two years of going public. 
The returns to the acquiring vehicle firm can be significantly positive at the 
expense of the private firm shareholder value (Gleason et al, 2005).   
 
According to Gleason et al (2005), self-underwritten IPOs are IPOs where the issuing 
firm underwrites its own shares. The firm’s management would manage the new 
issue as broker-dealer, markets the issue using roadshows and determines the offer 
price to be considered by investors. Self-underwritten IPOs usually take the form of 
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best efforts contracts and are associated with small issues of up to US$1 million. The 
advantages include reduction of offer cost and elimination of uncertainty about 
securing a firm commitment offer. Management may also be able to secure a higher 
offer price than the underwriting investment banker would from sophisticated 
institutional investors. The disadvantages include the burden on and opportunity cost 
of required managerial resources. Furthermore, the firm forgoes the expert marketing 
ability of underwriting investment banker to key institutional investors, certifications 
effect which endorses the offer and the aftermarket performance stabilisation.  
 
According to Firer et al (2008), in addition to the going-public methods discussed 
above, there are three other JSE issue methods namely introduction, private placing 
and preferential offer. An introduction is the quickest and easiest of entry onto the 
JSE. It is utilised when the issuer does not need to raise capital through the issue 
and if it already has the required shareholder spread. Once the company has 
received approval from the JSE Listings Committee, the company is introduced to the 
JSE and the listing of its shares is done. The only document required is a simple pre-
listing statement containing the salient information about the company. Private 
placing is an offer for unissued or issued but not yet listed shares to selected 
investors through a private arrangement and not to the public. This takes place 
immediately before the shares are listed on the JSE. A preferential offer is when a 
company makes a preferred offer to its associates, directors, employees or selected 
institutions. It is similar to private placing in that specific investors are offered a 
certain number of shares which the company wishes to allocate to them.  
 
The conventional IPO as the most popular listing method is discussed in detail below.      
2.2 Objectives and attributes of a successful IPO 
There are various reasons why firms may opt to go public. In the same vain, there 
are also various benefits for doing so by use of IPOs. Some of the major objectives 
and benefits of IPOs include the following (Young and Zaima, 1998): 
- IPOs are a key additional source of equity capital for business ventures; 
- They are an exit mechanism for venture capitalists and entrepreneurs; 
- Taking a company public improves its profile as a listed firm is required to 
maintain certain governance, financial reporting and disclosure standards 
stipulated by stock exchange authorities. 
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- Going public also diversifies the ownership structure of the company which 
improves the liquidity of its shares. 
- When a firm is listed and its profile is improved, it becomes easier to borrow 
funds from debt capital markets and to return to the public equity market to 
fund organic and acquisitive growth without straining internal cashflows. 
- Information about the company becomes readily available for use by 
stakeholders in decision making. 
 
Reilly and Hatfield (1969) suggested that a successful offer achieves the following for 
key stakeholders: 
- The required equity level that was sought by the issuing corporation; 
- Protection of the reputation of the underwriting investment bank. This is 
achieved by optimising between the success of the capital raised for the 
issuing firm and leaving sufficient money on the table to secure future investor 
interest and participation; 
- For investors, pricing of the IPO is done in order to allow for sufficient money 
to be left on the table so as to ensure long-term performance of the IPO.  
2.3 Listing process, IPO contractual mechanisms and characteristics 
According to Firer et al (2008), the JSE procedure for listing (without raising capital) 
or public offer (which involves the raising of capital) is as follows: 
• Firstly, approval is sought from by board of directors of the company; 
• Then, the submission of documents that contain disclosure of operating and 
financial details to the JSE Listing division through a JSE approved sponsor. 
• This is followed by a formal application by the issuer, the proposed 
prospectus (where capital is sought from the public) or pre-listing statement 
(in the case of listing without raising capital), confirmation statements from 
reporting accountants and attorneys are then submitted to the JSE twenty-
one days before they are published in the press. 
• The pre-listing statement is then published, starting with the JSE Securities 
Services News Service, then in the press in two official languages including 
English. This includes details of the company, nature and history of 
operations, prospects, directors’ details, all its listing professional advisors, 
details of all its classes of shares, issue price and last day of subscription.  
• The offer is normally open to the public for three weeks. 
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There are principally two contractual mechanisms of going public namely firm 
commitment and best efforts methods (Ritter, 1987). The firm commitment offer 
refers to an issue wherein the issuing firm sells the entire issue to the underwriter, 
who then attempts to resell it (Firer, 2008). The underwriting investment bank will 
take-up all shares unsold during the offer (Swanepoel, 1999). On the other hand, the 
best efforts offer is an IPO where the underwriter does not take-up shares unsold 
during the offer, but will do its best to sell all shares on offer (Swanepoel, 1999). It is 
therefore characterised by uncertainty since its success is entirely dependent on the 
degree of market take-up. The listing process under the firm commitment approach 
(in USA) is as follows (Ritter, 1987 and Gleason et al, 2005): 
• It starts with the registration of the listing statement describing the issuing firm 
and the proposed offer with the SEC, the securities regulatory authority; 
• then the issuance of a preliminary prospectus by issuing firm and underwriting 
investment bank including investor canvassing and expressions of interest by 
potential investors; 
• regulatory approval of the offer is granted; 
• pricing meeting to decide on offer price and number of shares to be sold; 
• the final prospectus is issued and then; 
• underwriting of offer by the underwriting investment bank. This also involves 
the underwriting investment bank providing a guarantee to deliver the net 
proceeds after commissions to the issuing firm regardless of whether the offer 
was fully subscribed or not.   
 
The listing process under the best efforts approach is as follows (Ritter, 1987): 
• It starts with the registration of the listing statement describing the issuing firm 
and the proposed offer with the securities regulatory authority; 
• Then the agreement between the issuer and investment bank on the offer 
price as well as the minimum and maximum number of shares to be issued; 
• regulatory approval of the offer follows; 
• Thereafter, the investment bank circulates the prospectus and makes best 
efforts to sell the shares to investors; 
• If the minimum number of shares is not subscribed for during a specified 
period, normally 90 days, the offer is withdrawn and the issuer does not 
receive any money. 
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Table 2 below gives a comparison of characteristics of firm commitment and best 
efforts approaches (Ritter, 1987):  
 
Firm Commitment Best Efforts 
1. Suitable for larger (by sales and book 
value) and more established firms  
1. Suitable for smaller and growing firms 
2. Less information asymmetry  2. More information asymmetry 
3. Larger offers 3. Smaller offers 
4. Offer costs are lower due to 
economies of scale 
4. Offer costs higher due to indirect costs 
of underpricing 
5. Valuations are relatively more certain 5. Valuations are relatively uncertain 
6. Lower initial returns 6. Higher initial returns 
7. Less underpricing 7. More underpricing 
8. Offer take-up and success is 
guaranteed by underwriter  
8. Uncertain take-up, offer can be 
withdrawn if minimum is not reached 
9. Investment bank bears ultimate risk 9. Issuing firm bears ultimate risk 
Table 2: Characteristics of listing contracts 
 
According to Loughran et al (1994), IPO contractual mechanisms vary depending on 
the stage of information acquisition process at which the offer price is set and the 
basis of allocation of shares namely pro-rata and discriminatory (price or quantity) 
methods. Contractual mechanisms are characterised by the following attributes 
(Loughran et al, 1994): 
- Whether there are binding institutional constraints / regulatory restrictions / 
governmental influence on offer price setting or ; 
- Contracts which are voluntary in nature. These are characterised by the degree 
of information availability for setting the offer price and the possibility of share 
allocation discrimination.  
 
The study by Loughran et al (1994, Table 2) revealed a tendency for older and more 
established firms to deliver lower returns than younger and less established firms. 
Returns and therefore the degree of underpricing are also generally higher for 
issuers which set offer prices prior to acquiring adequate information (mainly best 
efforts IPOs) about the demand for the offer than those which are set with more 
information (mainly firm commitment IPOs). Loughran et al (1994) argue that some 
issuers target a wide ownership structure by offer underpricing in order to achieve the 
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objective of high liquidity. This differs from the adverse selection proposition by Ritter 
(1987). The main features exhibited by the listing contracts observed by Loughran et 
al (1994) are uniform offer pricing, underpricing and discretionary share allocation 
unless prohibited by regulation. 
 
It must be noted that since this study entails the comparison of the predominantly 
larger JSE Main Board IPOs to predominantly smaller JSE AltX IPOs, the validity of 
some of the above mentioned IPO characteristics will therefore be tested. 
2.4 Factors affecting IPO performance 
In the section below, we discuss venture capital involvement, offer pricing, market 
timing and information asymmetry as some of the key factors that affect aftermarket 
return performance of IPO shares.        
2.4.1 Venture Capital Involvement 
The involvement of venture capitalists in a listing firm prior to and post listing has 
influence on the aftermarket performance of IPOs in the short and long term.  Brav 
and Gompers (1997) found that venture backed IPOs outperform non-venture 
backed IPOs. Bessler and Kurth (2007) argued that venture capitalists possess key 
adverse selection (screening) and moral hazard (monitoring) abilities that positively 
impact on initial and long-term returns and therefore the value of the firm. Swanepoel 
(1999) in a study on the influence of venture capitalists on small capitalisation IPOs 
confirmed that venture capitalists shareholding and involvement indeed have got 
influence especially in terms of reducing the level of underpricing and the information 
effect to other investors prior to and post listing. Lower underpricing means that the 
issuing company can raise more capital per share and even though short-term 
returns may be relatively low, the long-term investors would benefit from expected 
longer term performance. Venture capital certification is selective as venture 
capitalists take to leading underwriters, only prospective issuers for which their 
private information is favourable (de Carvalho, 2001). According to Swanepoel 
(1999), large shareholding (within the 10% to 60% range) before the IPO is viewed 
by other investors through the certification hypothesis as a backing of the company 
by the venture capital firm and implied to mean sound financial management of the 
company. If this position were to be maintained post-listing, this reassures other 
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investors of the venture capital firm’s confidence of the listing firms’ future prospects. 
However, a substantial exit by the venture capitalists especially shortly after listing is 
viewed negatively by the market to mean offloading or exiting of a poor quality 
investment through the IPO (Swanepoel, 1999; Bessler and Kurth, 2007). Gompers 
and Lerner (1998) also observed that venture backed-IPOs significantly outperform 
before the exit and significantly underperform after the exit of the venture capitalist. 
Lock-up periods for pre-IPO venture capitalist or other shareholders affect 
performance in that, strong outperformance is evident during the lock-in period and 
significant underperformance once it has expired (Bessler and Kurth, 2007).   
 
It must however be noted that findings by Swanepoel (1999) do not mean that 
venture backed firms are less risky, automatically receive interest from more 
investors or it is better to take a venture-backed firm public but there was a strong 
tendency towards them. It may be advisable for a small company looking to list to 
first seek venture capital investment and therefore also leverage off the venture 
capitalists’ business networks and management experience to corporatize the 
company and increase firm value ahead of listing.            
2.4.2 Offer Pricing  
Moodley (2009) in his work on Post Listings Performance of IPOs in SA discussed 
the importance of and differences that occur over IPO offer price or price range. The 
study highlights that the difficulty of pricing an IPO is due to the following reasons 
among others: 
- The non-existence of a universally acceptable valuation method; 
- Current valuation methods require subjective assumptions and  
- That pricing is done in order to satisfy different stakeholders who have 
diverging objectives principally the issuing firm, the underwriting investment 
bank and investors.  
 
According to Loughran et al (1994), generally, pricing of offers is done to achieve 
more objectives besides proceeds maximisation such as, efforts to increase the 
number of shareholders and thus share liquidity, tax avoidance and politically 
motivated pricing.  
 
A study by Prasad et al (2006) concluded that underpricing is due to: 
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- A deliberate motive to deliver return benefit to investors for taking risk in these 
predominantly risky IPOs; 
- Information asymmetry leading to uncertainty over the true value of the 
shares or the company; 
- The secondary market seeing upside value in the share and their demand 
increasing the share price even above expected levels; 
- Regulatory factors may distort accurate IPO pricing.     
 
Underpricing is a factor which can affect the long-run IPO performance. Loughran 
and Ritter (2001) concluded that IPO underpricing has increased over time 
internationally. However, Loughran et al (1994) found that: 
- Short-run underpricing was evident in all 25 countries considered in the study 
albeit at varying degrees of between 4% for France and 80% for Malaysia. 
The study revealed high initial returns with subsequent daily returns in the 
aftermarket tending to decline towards zero.   
- The degree of underpricing is significantly related to the contractual 
mechanism utilised, characteristics of listing firms and institutional constraints. 
Countries with most listing firms which are more established (relatively large, 
with long operating histories) and whose listing mechanisms have auction-like 
features tend to have lower initial average returns. On the contrary, higher 
institutional constraints such as regulatory influence on offer pricing mainly in 
emerging markets, discretionary listing mechanisms and countries with 
predominantly speculative start-ups going public are associated with higher 
average initial returns; 
- The reduction in regulatory influence in IPO pricing in the 1990s in East Asia 
was expected to result in less IPO underpricing than the 1980s. 
 
Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990) analysed the impact of discretionary allocation and 
price discrimination on IPO pricing. The analysis of a contract in which the listing 
price is set using information from investors established that regular investors provide 
the issuing firm or investment banker with valuations of the issue. This information is 
then used in setting the offer pricing. According to Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990), in 
order to encourage the regular investors to share valuation information, some IPOs 
are underpriced. However, the degree of underpricing per IPO varies depending on 
the acquisition and use of investor valuation information and demand for the offer as 
well as the ability of the investment banker to effect price and/ quantity discrimination. 
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2.4.3 Market Timing and Information Asymmetry 
There has been empirical evidence of market timing around periods of high stock 
market levels and long-run underperformance (Loughran et al, 1994). Fourteen of the 
fifteen countries analysed over periods of at least eighteen years by Loughran et al 
(1994) provided evidence of positive correlations between IPO activity and stock 
market levels. According to Loughran et al (1994), the following are some of the 
reasons for the above trend: 
- Business cycles present firms with better investment opportunities in some 
periods than others. In periods of high investment opportunities, firms are 
expected to raise external predominantly equity capital including through 
IPOs to capitalise on positive net present value growth opportunities and for 
stock prices to be high; 
- Private firms would time the market to take advantage of the opportunity to 
raise equity capital at a lower cost than at other times. 
Based on information from eight countries, Loughran et al (1994) also suggest that 
high IPO volume periods tend to be associated with lower long-term return 
performance. A study by Schultz (2002) revealed that long-run underperformance is 
very likely to be observed ex-post even in an efficient market. The premise is that 
more firms issue equity at higher than stock prices even though they cannot predict 
future returns and ex-post, issuers seem to time the market because there are 
usually more offerings at market peaks than when stock prices are low (Schultz, 
2002). 
 
This brings an interesting question about long-run underperformance; that is, do 
IPOs underperform in the long-run because IPOs usually timed during bull markets 
rather than bear markets are overpriced? Is the underperformance a result of the fact 
that IPOs are increasingly getting riskier since the 1990s? According to Loughran et 
al (1994), if market timing is successfully done by listing companies when cost of 
equity is relatively low, post-listing investor returns should subsequently be low. 
Peristiani (2003) argues that companies taken public by top underwriters or funded 
by venture capital exhibit higher relative volatility and lower likelihood of survival. The 
riskiness of IPO shares (dominated by high growth technology, internet and dotcom 
issuers) relative to shares of nonissuing peer group increased by about 30% in the 
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1990s (Peristiani, 2003). However, in line with documented corporate finance theory, 
Barry and Brown (1984) argue that older and more established firms have less 
information asymmetry and therefore lower risk of aftermarket returns compared to 
younger and less established firms. The study suggests that smaller firms have more 
information asymmetry and therefore higher risk. In accordance with the small firm 
effect, past studies including Banz (1981) and Reinganum (1981) suggest that small 
capitalisation firms earn significantly higher risk-adjusted returns than larger 
capitalisation firms. This study will test this phenomenon in the South African context 
after the introduction of the JSE AltX. 
2.5 Short and long-term IPO aftermarket performance  
The study by Moodley (2009) was premised on the assumption that primary market 
investors enjoy the premium offered by IPOs upon listing but secondary market 
investors do not benefit from that premium. The study focused on secondary market 
investors and was aimed at assessing if the magnitude of the initial premium could 
be used to determine the one year aftermarket performance of IPOs between 1998 
and 2007 on the JSE. Moodley (2009) established that even though the IPOs over 
the period offered a mean premium of 28.39% to primary investors, the correlation 
between the value of initial premium and the one year aftermarket performance was -
10.51%. As a result, Moodley (2009) concluded that there is little predictive power 
between the value of the initial premium and the long-term performance as measured 
by one year aftermarket performance. A strong negative relationship was noted. 
Moodley’s (2009) global and extensive literature review of works by many authors led 
to the conclusion that long-run underperformance has been evident in most markets 
and that the initial day premium was not a proxy for long-term performance. 
 
According to Michacly and Shaw (1994) and Carter and Manaster (1990), IPO 
underpricing is lower for issuers which engage reputable underwriting investment 
banks and whose operating as well as stock performance is better on an aftermarket 
basis. Bharat and Kini (1994) found that the operating performance of IPO firms 
declined post listing. The study attributed this to increased agency costs, 
manipulation of financial statements prior to listing and timing the market to ensure 
that listing coincides with periods of unsustainably good operating performance. 
Loughran et al (1994, Table 7) examined initial and three-year post-IPO return 
performance in seven countries. High average buy-and-hold nominal returns were 
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earned in Japan of 110%, Korea of 58%, Sweden of 73% and UK of 56%. Other 
countries had lower returns namely Germany of 24%, Singapore of 23%, USA of 8% 
and Finland of -22% and for Brazil the information was not available. However, 
holding-period returns, adjusted for the market index or matching firm were negative 
for Brazil, Finland, Germany, Singapore, UK and USA. Based on information from 
nine countries, the study also concluded that IPOs tend to generate lower long-term 
returns especially for riskier or less established compared to more established 
issuing firms and with greater degree of market timing.      
 
M’kombe (2000) in his work on aftermarket price performance of IPOs on the JSE for 
the period 1980 to 1998 sought to answer the following questions: 
- Do shares that list on the JSE yield abnormal risk-adjusted returns? 
- Are the returns received after investing in IPOs on the JSE dependent on the 
holding period of the investment?  
- Do certain characteristics of the IPO process influence post listing returns?  
 
After applying risk adjusted models, M’kombe (2000) found that JSE IPO returns 
were significantly less than expected buy-and-hold returns. The difference between 
the expected returns and actual returns increased for longer investment horizons for 
the JSE. Similar results have been found for London Stock Exchange, New York 
Stock Exchange and the Brazilian Stock Exchange (M’kombe, 2000). The study also 
found that IPO characteristics such as listing price and capital raised can influence 
aftermarket performance share price performance and returns.  
 
M’kombe’s (2000) study concluded the following about performance, that: 
- The effect of initial premia and thus the IPO underpricing did not significantly 
influence the aftermarket performance. It was inferred that superior short-term 
IPO performance cannot be used to predict long-term performance but that 
long-run underperformance of initially high premia IPOs can be attributable to 
price correction; 
- The listing price had influence on IPO aftermarket performance. IPOs priced 
between 200 and 499 cents least underperformed the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM) expected returns. IPOs priced below 100 cents were 
perceived to be risky and their performance was not commensurate with that 
risk level even though they had the highest initial premia. IPOs priced from 
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500 cents were found to have been overpriced and delivered the least long-
term returns.         
- In terms of market timing, that 1, 3 and 5 year buy-and-hold periods for hot 
issue period IPOs delivered lower performance than cold issue period IPOs. 
This was partly because hot issues had a higher proportion of low priced risky 
shares which even though they had high initial premia, they had consistently 
low returns in the long-term. Research on the JSE revealed that this is 
because hot issue IPO market take-up is premised mainly on speculation and 
less on fundamentals. Some research in the USA displayed similar 
characteristics as well.  
- That the number or volume of shares issued had no influence on aftermarket 
performance.  
- For investment horizons of up to 5 years on a buy-and-hold basis, it was 
concluded that IPOs that raised between R25 million and R75 million 
performed better than IPOs that raised other amounts.    
 
The study by Boles (2001) revealed among others, the following facts about IPO 
performance in South Africa: 
- significant increase in IPOs on the JSE between 1997 and 1998 most of 
which were significantly overpriced; 
- 90% of the 155 listings were small capitalisation companies of less than R1 
billion market capitalisation and 70% of less that R250 million; 
- Initial premium was higher for smaller capitalisation issuers; 
- However, evidence reflected that the 155 small-capitalisation IPO companies 
performed poorly in the aftermarket of 2.7 years as compared to the JSE’s all 
share, financial & industrial, mid and small capitalisation indices; 
- The study by Boles (2001) was meant to identify factors that affected the 
performance of small capitalisation companies listed on the JSE for the 2 
years up to end of 1998.  
 
Boles’ (2001) study found that even though they could not identify the causal factors 
for abnormally high initial premia, industry practitioners were of the view that the 
following were key reasons for IPO activity: 
- The IPO cycle, a self-fulfilling process where the success of small 
capitalisation IPOs led to increasingly more small-capitalisation IPOs.    
- IPO market role players also influenced IPO activity over the period.                  
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Boles (2001) concluded from empirical evidence and various global literatures that: 
- High volume, small capitalisation IPOs experience abnormal initial premia. 
This is attributable to information asymmetry. Furthermore, there is no 
significant relationship between initial premium and aftermarket performance;  
- On average the aftermarket performance of small, low book/market value 
IPOs floated during periods of high IPO volumes underperform but it may 
take time to manifest itself; 
- IPOs underwritten by reputable investment banks and those backed by 
venture capitalists tend to outperform comparable IPOs; 
- Stockbroking analysts tend to be overoptimistic in assessing IPOs; 
- Investors act overconfidently and invest irrationally in IPOs; 
- Management develop inflated perceptions of the value of their firms during 
bull markets.        
 
A study by Young and Zaima (1988) on the aftermarket performance of small firm 
IPOs concluded that there is no positive relationship between the risk profile of small 
firm IPOs and aftermarket returns. Evidence presented in the study suggested that 
less established, younger firms revealed higher initial underpricing and variance of 
returns than older, more established firms. To the contrary, the same study 
established that average aftermarket holding period return for more established firms 
was higher than for less established firms. This observation was made for holding 
periods of three weeks (0% return for younger and 4% for older firms), one year (-
32% return for younger and 26% for older firms) and eighteen months (6% return for 
younger and 36% for older firms) from the closing price of the first day of trade. The 
number of firms which experienced negative aftermarket returns continued to be 
statistically significant even up to the 18 months horizon. It is therefore possible for 
investors to capitalise on this performance trend by subscribing for the IPO and 
disposing of the shares during initial trade.  
 
Young and Zaima (1988) on the aftermarket performance of small firm IPOs 
concluded that: 
- If entrepreneurs planning to publicly list younger, less established firms 
based the decision on aftermarket performance of their stock, they would 
probably not have many financial alternatives utilising corporate stock 
thereafter; 
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- Investors in small firm public offers may also be disappointed by the poor 
aftermarket performance of younger firms. However, these results may imply 
efficient offer pricing of small firm IPOs as returns were not significant;   
- The relationship between risk measured using age as a proxy and return was 
found not to exist. On the contrary, aftermarket performance of older and 
more established firms was found to be favourable and; 
- Finally, the study concluded that entrepreneurs and investors should not 
base superior aftermarket return expectations solely on specific industries. 
   
Many studies reveal global IPO long-run underperformance. The above results and 
conclusions are consistent with the study by Ritter (1991) of poor long-run stock 
performance. Based on a sample of 1526 USA IPOs listed between 1975 and 1984, 
Ritter (1991) found that IPO shares underperformed market indices over three years 
(and even over more than three years) and surrogate firms by industry and size (Yi, 
2001). Furthermore, Yi (2001) concluded that IPOs with positive earnings at listing 
performed better than those that had negative earnings. These findings suggested 
over-optimism by investors especially for firms which had negative pre-listing 
earnings. Yi (1992) and Loughran (1993) supported the same phenomenon of 
underperformance which continued for periods of at least 6 years for IPOs made 
between 1967 and 1987. The nominal average holding returns over the period were 
however positive over the 3 year horizon but monthly returns were mostly negative if 
adjusted for applicable indices (Ritter, 1991). 
 
Gompers and Lerner’s (2001) study concluded that the relative performance of the 
IPO sample depends on the method of examining performance. The event-time buy-
and-hold abnormal returns methodology suggests that the sample underperforms but 
cumulative abnormal returns method suggests superior performance. Calendar-time 
analysis between 1935 and 1976 showed that IPOs provided returns as much as the 
market (Gompers and Lerner, 2001).  
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3 METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Data  
Data and information for the study are mainly in the form of historic share price 
performance of JSE listed IPOs and long-term bond interest rates. As such, most 
data was procured from information sources which were deemed to be reliable and 
independent such as the JSE Information Services, I-Net Bridge and BMF McGregor. 
Share data was corroborated between the various information sources named above 
to ensure accuracy and reliability. Information on the South African R157 bond 
interest rates sourced from I-Net Bridge and BMF McGregor were verified through 
the South African Reserve Bank (Research Department).  
3.2 Methodology 
The method of analysis is the panel data analysis, which is suitable to analyse a 
cross-section of many variables and over different periods of time. Since this study 
involved the analysis of two samples of IPO daily share price data from the JSE Main 
Board and the JSE AltX over a period of up to two years, panel data analysis was 
found to be suitable. Quantitative data analysis methods are utilised in this study, 
where the raw share price and long-term bond interest rate (as an indicator of the 
risk-free rate) data procured from the JSE, I-Net Bridge and McGregor were 
converted into Microsoft Excel format for ease of manipulation.  
 
Once in Microsoft Excel format, manipulation of raw data to extract information was 
done as follows: 
i. Firstly, IPO closing share price and long term bond interest rates for 
the R157 bond data were listed in order of date from the first day of 
listing until the most recent prices available for each share (and 
corresponding dates for the R157 bonds) starting with the earliest 
listed IPO share; 
ii. Secondly, all the above IPO closing share prices, listed according to 
date were combined on a worksheet for the entire population of IPOs 
for the JSE Main Board and JSE AltX, respectively; 
iii. Thirdly, the analysis period was chosen from the launch of the JSE 
AltX Exchange and to avoid contamination of results, the cut-off date 
28 Short, Medium & Long-Term IPO Performance in South Africa:  
JSE Alt-X versus JSE Main Board – The Post JSE Alt-X Evidence (2004-7) 
Bothwell Manikai (0203729V) Master of Finance & Investment, Wits Business School 
 
was guided by the start of the global financial crisis. This resulted in 
representative samples of IPO shares listed since the debut of the 
JSE AltX in 2004 to end of June 2007. For comparative purposes, the 
above sample period was used for the JSE Main Board and the JSE 
AltX exchanges. This resulted in a sample of 36 IPOs from a 
population of 76 IPOs for the JSE AltX and a sample of 40 IPOs from 
a population of 82 IPOs for the JSE Main Board. IPOs with 
inadequate data, data discrepancies and outliers were excluded, 
resulting in final samples of 35 and 33 for the JSE AltX and the Main 
Board, respectively;    
 
iv. Daily Holding Period Returns (DHPR) were then calculated for each of 
the sample IPOs to reflect performance using the following formula: 
DHPRi = Closing Price on Day t – Closing Price on Listing Date 
Closing Price on Listing Date 
   Where: t is the number of calendar days from date of listing 
    i is the IPO share listed on JSE Main Board or AltX  
 
v. Average DHPR were calculated for the short-term (up to 30 calendar 
days from date of listing), medium-term (up to 1 year from date of 
listing) and long-term (up to 2 years from date of listing), using the 
formula below: 
Average DHPR = [∑DHPRi] / n 
Where n = number of returns data per holding period per IPO share 
 
The average DHPR was calculated per sample IPO share and then 
the simple mean for the entire JSE Main Board and AltX samples, 
respectively, to enable comparison between the two samples and 
therefore the performance of the IPOs on the two listing platforms.  
 
vi. The standard deviation of the DHPR was calculated for the short-term, 
medium-term and long-term using the Microsoft Excel built-in formula.  
 
vii. The South African Government’s R157 bond interest rates were used 
as a proxy for the risk-free rate of return (Rf). The effective mean risk-
free rate was calculated for the short, medium and long-term; 
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viii. The Sharpe Ratio was used to calculate the risk-adjusted return 
performance of each IPO on the two JSE platforms. The formula for 
the Sharpe Ratio is given below: 
Si = (DHPRi - Rf) / SDi  
Where: Si is the Sharpe Ratio of sample IPOi 
SDi is the standard deviation of DHPRi 
 
It must be noted however that the Sharpe Ratio maybe misleading if 
its value is negative. Increased risk in such case may lead to a higher 
value for the Sharpe Ratio and therefore comparison of performance 
of different IPOs or the samples for the two platforms in such instance 
may be inaccurate. To address this weakness, the Sharpe Ratio was 
used concurrently with the inverse of the Coefficient of Variation (CV). 
     
ix. The Coefficient of Variation (CV) and its inverse were calculated for 
each sample IPO. The CV gives the risk borne per unit of return and 
its inverse gives the return achieved per unit of risk undertaken. Their 
values reflect the risk-adjusted return profile of an IPO as given in the 
formula below: 
CVi = SDi / Average DHPRi 
The inverse of CV was utilised to provide emphasis on risk-adjusted 
return and CV was utilised in order to compare the risk profiles of JSE 
Main Board and AltX IPOs.  
 
x. Significance testing was done on the null hypothesis at 5% level of 
significance, using the t-test to check the significance of the data and 
the results. The t-test (using the test statistic for a test of the 
difference between two population means) was found to be most 
suitable because IPO returns are parametric and the test involved the 
difference between two means. 
 
It was assumed that: 
- IPO returns are normally distributed since according to corporate 
finance theory namely the random walk theory (Fama, 1965), 
share prices (and therefore their returns) follow a random-walk; 
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- Returns of JSE Main Board and AltX sample IPOs are 
independent of each other; 
- This study and the hypothesis below test the mean returns of 
two populations, namely, the JSE Main Board and AltX; 
- The populations variances although unknown were assumed to 
be unequal since the standard deviation of returns of the JSE 
Main Board IPO sample were found to be different from that of 
the JSE AltX sample as presented in the results section (Table 3 
and Annexure A).    
 
The null hypothesis tested using the above methodology is given 
below:  
H0: u1,t=u2,t; the JSE Alt-X IPOs perform the same as JSE 
Main Board IPOs in short, medium or long-term on a nominal 
return basis. In this case, t represents short, medium and long-
term respectively.  
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4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
This section presents the analyses and discussion of the results from the 
methodology applied as explained in Chapter 3. The results of the performance 
evaluation methodology utilised through a combination of the nominal mean return 
and risk adjusted return for the JSE AltX and the JSE Main Board are summarised in 
this chapter.  
4.1 Results 
A detailed tabular analysis of the return performance of all JSE AltX and JSE Main 
Board sample IPOs in the short, medium and long-term is presented in Annexure A. 
The IPO returns utilised were tested at 5% significance level and found to be 
statistically significant. Table 3 below summarises the comparative performance of 
the two listing platforms on an aggregate basis:  
 
30-Day  Short-term
30-Day Mean 
Return
Standard 
Deviation
30-Day Mean 
Risk-Free Rate
Sharpe 
Ratio
Coefficient of 
Variation (CV) CV Inverse
AltX 3.2% 24.9% 0.2% 0.12 7.86 0.13
Main Board 6.5% 27.0% 0.2% 0.23 4.13 0.24
1 Year Medium-term
1-Year Mean 
Return
Standard 
Deviation
1-Year Mean 
Risk-Free Rate
Sharpe 
Ratio
Coefficient of 
Variation (CV) CV Inverse
AltX 18.6% 54.3% 8.2% 0.19 2.93 0.34
Main Board 31.1% 44.4% 8.2% 0.52 1.42 0.70
2-Year  Long-term
2-Year Mean 
Return
Standard 
Deviation
2-Year Mean 
Risk-Free Rate
Sharpe 
Ratio
Coefficient of 
Variation (CV) CV Inverse
AltX 20.6% 73.8% 8.4% 0.17 3.58 0.28
Main Board 40.4% 66.6% 8.3% 0.48 1.65 0.61
JSE AltX & MAIN BOARD COMPARATIVE IPO PERFORMANCE SUMMARY
 
Table 3: JSE Alternative Exchange and Main Board Comparative IPO Performance 
 
Regarding the nominal and risk adjusted performance, three calendar periods were 
considered, namely 30 days (short-term), 1 year (medium term) and 2 years (long-
term) in measuring the return performance. Analyses were done on a nominal mean 
return and risk adjusted basis using the Sharpe Ratio. This was complemented by 
the inverse of the coefficient of variation. The coefficient of variation and standard 
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deviation were used to reflect the risk profiles of the newly listed companies and 
therefore that of the listing platforms.  
 
For all the periods under consideration, the results in Table 3 above show that the 
JSE Main Board IPOs performed better than the JSE AltX IPOs as measured by both 
DHPR mean return as well as on a risk-adjusted basis as measured by the Sharpe 
Ratio as follows:  
 
• In the short-term, the nominal average DHPR for the JSE Main Board IPOs 
was 103% higher than the JSE AltX IPOs. On a risk adjusted basis, the JSE 
Main Board IPOs outperformed JSE AltX IPOs by 92%. Over the same 
period, the risk per unit of return as measured by coefficient of variation was 
90% higher for the JSE AltX IPOs compared to the JSE Main Board IPOs. 
 
• In the medium-term, the average return performance for JSE Main Board 
IPOs was still superior to that of the JSE AltX by 67% on a nominal basis and 
174% on a risk-adjusted basis as measured by the Sharpe Ratio. The risk-
per-unit of return was higher for the JSE AltX by 106% than the JSE Main 
Board. 
 
• In the long-term, the JSE Main Board IPOs on average performed 96% better 
than the JSE AltX on a nominal return basis. On a risk adjusted basis, JSE 
Main Board IPOs outperformed the JSE AltX IPOs by 182% on average. The 
risk-per-unit of return was 117% higher for the JSE AltX IPOs than the JSE 
Main Board IPOs. 
 
It is noteworthy that the above results appear not to summarily support corporate 
finance theory where it is expected that higher risk financial securities would be 
compensated by relatively higher returns. An example is the small firms effect where 
smaller-capitalisation firms are expected to earn significantly higher risk-adjusted 
returns than larger capitalisation firms (Ban, 1981 and Reinganum, 1981). We 
however, conducted a hypothesis test at 95% confidence interval which did not reject 
the hypothesis that returns from JSE Main Board IPOs equal JSE AltX IPO returns in 
the short, medium or long-term on a nominal return basis. The results of the 
significance testing are summarised in Tables 4 (i) to 4(iii) below. 
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Short-term (30 Day) Main Board Alt-X
Variable 1 Variable 2
Mean 0.065276847 0.031642764
Variance 0.072678812 0.0618042
Observations 33 35
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0
df 65
t Stat 0.533926639
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.29760682
t Critical one-tail 1.668635976 Accept
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.595213639
t Critical two-tail 1.997137908 Accept
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances
 
Table 4(i) - Hypothesis Test: H0: u1,t=u2,t for the short-term  
 
Medium-term (1 Year) Main Board Alt-X
Variable 1 Variable 2
Mean 0.293331593 0.185592194
Variance 0.196928986 0.294843399
Observations 33 35
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0
df 65
t Stat 0.898088993
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.186226404
t Critical one-tail 1.668635976 Accept
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.372452808
t Critical two-tail 1.997137908 Accept
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances
 
Table 4(ii) - Hypothesis Test: H0: u1,t=u2,t for the medium-term  
 
Long-term (2 Year) Main Board AltX
Variable 1 Variable 2
Mean 0.40405777 0.206253425
Variance 0.442921888 0.543968842
Observations 33 35
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0
df 66
t Stat 1.162271905
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.124655346
t Critical one-tail 1.668270514 Accept 
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.249310691
t Critical two-tail 1.996564419 Accept 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances
 
Table 4(iii) - Hypothesis Test: H0: u1,t=u2,t for the long-term  
 
However, in line with documented in corporate finance theory, JSE AltX IPO results 
support the fact that smaller IPO returns are relatively riskier than IPO of larger and 
more established ones.  
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The above results of this study also support findings by Young and Zaima (1988) 
that, average aftermarket returns for more established firms (assumed to be the 
larger JSE Main Board IPOs in this study) are higher than less established firms 
(assumed to be smaller JSE AltX firms in this study). In the study of the aftermarket 
performance of small firm IPOs, Young and Zaima (1988) rejected the hypothesis of 
a positive relationship between small firm IPO risk and post-listing returns. The 
results of this study therefore support findings by Young and Zaima (1988).  
 
A resemblance was observed between the two that, over time, the effective annual 
return for the short-term, medium-term and long-term decreased for both the JSE 
Main Board IPOs and the JSE AltX IPOs as depicted in Figure 1 below: 
 
 
Effective Annual Return 30 Day 1 Year 2 Year
AltX 45.9% 18.6% 9.8%
Main Board 113.0% 31.1% 18.5%  
Figure 1: JSE Effective Annual Return Trends 
 
The above results support conclusions of Moodley’s (2009) study that there is little 
predictive power between the value of the initial premium and the long-term 
performance as measured by one year aftermarket performance. The study was 
premised on the assumption that IPO primary market investors realise higher returns 
than secondary market investors. The results of this study also support M’kombe’s 
(2000) findings that short-term IPO performance cannot be used to predict long-term 
performance. It is evident from Figure 1 above that effective annual returns 
decreased over time for both listing platforms albeit it at a faster rate for the JSE 
Main Board IPOs between the short and medium term. These results support the 
finding by Loughran et al (1994) that, IPOs tend to generate lower long-term returns. 
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They also support Boles’ (2001) conclusion that, there is no significant relationship 
between initial premia and aftermarket performance. However, it must be noted that 
the 2 year period performance analysis for all JSE IPOs listed from July 2005 as 
shown in Annexure A, included an element of the impact of the 2007 recession which 
is estimated to have started from July 2007. 
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5 CONCLUSION 
The aim of this study was to establish the short, medium and long-term return 
performance of smaller capitalisation JSE AltX IPOs in comparison to the 
performance of larger JSE Main Board IPOs. This was done on nominal and risk-
adjusted bases by analysing daily share price data of two samples of 35 JSE AltX 
IPOs and 33 JSE Main Board IPOs for the period between January 2004 and June 
2007. The study furthered the work that has been done on aftermarket performance 
of IPOs in South Africa by other authors, including Moodley (2009), Boles (2001) and 
M’kombe (2000). As part of the literature review, reference was made to studies in 
the research of IPOs performance in South Africa and internationally. This was done 
based on the broad themes of IPO listing processes among competing going public 
mechanisms, IPO contractual mechanisms and characteristics, attributes of a 
successful IPO, factors affecting IPO performance as well as research on short-run 
and long-run post-listing performance of IPOs. Previous research work on IPOs in 
South Africa did not focus on the JSE AltX IPO performance and as such this study 
attempted to fill that knowledge gap. Nominal IPO performance was measured using 
daily holding period returns and risk-adjusted return using the Sharpe Ratio 
concurrently with the inverse of the coefficient of variation. The returns data were 
found to be statistically significant. The risk profile of each IPO share and the listing 
platforms were measured using the standard deviation and coefficient of variation.  
 
Our findings were not summarily in support to corporate finance theory which asserts 
that riskier securities are expected to deliver higher returns compared to less riskier 
ones. The results revealed that even though JSE AltX IPO returns were riskier on 
average as expected by corporate finance theory, they generated lower nominal and 
risk-adjusted returns than larger JSE Main Board IPOs which would normally be 
expected to be less risky and therefore generate relatively lower returns. The above 
findings were consistent over the short, medium and long-term. A similarity between 
the JSE AltX and Main Board IPO performance was identified in that the effective 
annual average daily holding period returns decreased over time from the short-term 
to the long-term. The decline was more pronounced between the short to medium-
term and for the Main Board IPOs. It must be noted that the 2007 economic 
recession might be a contributory factor to the poor long-term IPO performance since 
the period coincided with part of the research period. Finally, a hypothesis test at 5% 
level of significance did not reject the hypothesis that JSE AltX and Main Board IPOs 
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have similar performance in the short, medium and long-term. These results mean 
that even though the JSE Main Board IPOs outperform JSE Alt-X IPOs in the short, 
medium and long-term, the difference in performance was not statistically significant. 
 
Based on the above findings, it is therefore recommended that investors do not 
invest merely on the assumption that riskier IPOs provide higher returns. There is 
need for due diligence based on a variety of factors which affect IPO performance 
such as the objectives of the IPO (Boles, 2001), the pricing (Loughran and Ritter, 
2001) of the offer, to establish if there is likelihood of mispricing as well as timing the 
market (M’kombe, 2000) pre and post-listing operating performance (Yi, 2001). 
According to Moodley (2009), primary investors are more likely to earn higher returns 
than secondary investors. It is therefore advisable for investors to make best efforts 
to subscribe for the IPO at listing. It is also important for the investor to reconcile 
investment objectives and horizon to the above factors. 
 
In this study, we focused on the relative performance of JSE AltX and JSE Main 
Board IPOs in the short, medium and long-term. Interesting further studies may also 
be conducted in the area of the impact of small (JSE AltX) and large (JSE Main 
Board) company IPOs performance around economic cycles in emerging markets 
such as South Africa. In other words, research to assess the impact of economic 
crises such as the 2007 recession and booms on IPO performance and activity seem 
worthwhile.                            
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ANNEXURE A 
(i) JSE AltX IPO Post Listing Performance  
 
JSE AltX - IPO POST LISTING PERFORMANCE 30-DAY (SHORT-TERM)
Issuer 
Code Issuer
Listing 
Date
30-Day 
Mean 
Return
Standard 
Deviation
30-Day 
Mean Risk-
Free Rate
Sharpe 
Ratio
Coeffient of 
Variation (CV)
CV 
Inverse
XAN XANTIUM TECHNOLOGY HOLDINGS LIMITED 2004/08/20 -14.8% 5.4% 0.22% -2.77 -0.37 -2.73
MKX MILKWORX LIMITED 2004/09/27 31.0% 6.0% 0.21% 5.14 0.19 5.18
DTP DATAPRO GROUP LIMITED 2004/10/18 8.3% 6.1% 0.21% 1.34 0.73 1.37
YBA YOMHLABA RESOURCES LIMITED 2004/11/29 3.2% 10.2% 0.20% 0.29 3.22 0.31
ACH ARCH EQUITY LIMITED 2004/12/10 15.0% 5.3% 0.20% 2.81 0.35 2.84
ACD ALLIANCE DATA CORPORATION LIMITED 2005/03/30 -7.4% 8.7% 0.21% -0.88 -1.16 -0.86
ENL ENALENI PHARMACEUTICALS LIMITED 2005/06/10 30.0% 18.0% 0.20% 1.66 0.60 1.67
CMO CHROMETCO LIMITED 2005/08/12 -10.1% 6.5% 0.20% -1.58 -0.64 -1.55
WLL WELLCO HEALTH LIMITED 2005/09/22 -8.8% 11.0% 0.21% -0.81 -1.26 -0.79
ACC ACC-ROSS HOLDINGS LIMITED 2006/02/16 -39.7% 10.6% 0.19% -3.79 -0.27 -3.77
WEA W G WEARNE LIMITED 2006/02/21 27.2% 14.2% 0.19% 1.91 0.52 1.92
ESR ESOR LIMITED 2006/03/14 -11.0% 3.1% 0.19% -3.63 -0.28 -3.56
PSV PSV HOLDINGS LIMITED 2006/04/21 4.4% 3.6% 0.20% 1.15 0.83 1.20
SAN SANYATI HOLDINGS LIMITED 2006/06/02 -14.7% 4.7% 0.20% -3.15 -0.32 -3.11
TAS TASTE HOLDINGS LIMITED 2006/06/21 -5.6% 5.1% 0.21% -1.13 -0.92 -1.09
DLG DIALOGUE GROUP HOLDINGS LIMITED 2006/09/19 0.5% 3.4% 0.21% 0.10 6.36 0.16
GDN GOODERSON LEISURE CORPORATION LTD 2006/09/26 -5.2% 4.7% 0.21% -1.13 -0.92 -1.09
BFS BLUE FINANCIAL SERVICES LIMITED 2006/10/12 119.6% 41.7% 0.20% 2.86 0.35 2.87
MYD MYRIAD MEDICAL HOLDINGS LIMITED 2006/10/17 7.2% 3.7% 0.20% 1.89 0.52 1.94
IPS IPSA GROUP PLC 2006/10/19 5.3% 6.2% 0.20% 0.82 1.17 0.85
WKF Workforce Holdings Limited 2006/11/21 -1.3% 4.3% 0.20% -0.35 -3.33 -0.30
CEL CELCOM GROUP LIMITED 2006/11/22 -2.7% 6.8% 0.20% -0.43 -2.48 -0.40
SIC Safic Holdings Limited 2006/11/23 -7.4% 5.4% 0.20% -1.41 -0.73 -1.37
ATR Africa Cellular Towers Limited 2006/11/29 -5.7% 7.9% 0.20% -0.74 -1.40 -0.71
SUL SAB&T Ubuntu Holdings Limited 2006/11/30 -15.6% 6.9% 0.20% -2.29 -0.44 -2.26
TFX Top Fix Holdings Limited 2006/12/06 5.3% 4.9% 0.20% 1.04 0.93 1.08
IFC IFCA TECHNOLOGIES LIMITED 2006/12/08 -11.8% 3.4% 0.20% -3.57 -0.28 -3.51
IMU Imuniti Holdings Limited 2006/12/12 -9.1% 7.1% 0.20% -1.31 -0.78 -1.29
RAR RARE HOLDINGS LIMITED 2007/02/23 -11.3% 5.6% 0.20% -2.03 -0.50 -2.00
AET ALERT STEEL HOLDINGS LIMITED 2007/03/01 24.7% 2.2% 0.20% 11.38 0.09 11.47
TLM TELEMASTERS HOLDINGS LIMITED 2007/03/12 10.4% 4.2% 0.20% 2.42 0.41 2.47
RLF ROLFES TECHNOLOGY HOLDINGS LIMITED 2007/05/23 5.8% 3.8% 0.20% 1.50 0.64 1.56
ANS Ansys Limited 2007/06/07 4.9% 6.6% 0.20% 0.70 1.37 0.73
IWE Interwaste Holdings Limited 2007/06/14 1.6% 4.2% 0.20% 0.33 2.66 0.38
FPF Finbond Property Finance Limited 2007/06/15 -11.6% 6.2% 0.20% -1.93 -0.53 -1.89
AVERAGE 3.2% 24.9% 0.2% 0.12 7.86 0.13  
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JSE AltX - IPO POST LISTING PERFORMANCE 1-YEAR (MEDIUM-TERM)
Issuer 
Code Issuer
Listing 
Date
1-Year 
Mean 
Return
Standard 
Deviation
1-Year 
Mean Risk-
Free Rate
Sharpe 
Ratio
Coeffient of 
Variation (CV)
CV 
Inverse
XAN XANTIUM TECHNOLOGY HOLDINGS LIMITED 2004/08/20 -7.4% 9.2% 8.45% -1.73 -1.24 -0.81
MKX MILKWORX LIMITED 2004/09/27 129.5% 220.5% 8.32% 0.55 1.70 0.59
DTP DATAPRO GROUP LIMITED 2004/10/18 11.4% 19.2% 8.25% 0.17 1.67 0.60
YBA YOMHLABA RESOURCES LIMITED 2004/11/29 -15.2% 9.5% 8.13% -2.47 -0.62 -1.61
ACH ARCH EQUITY LIMITED 2004/12/10 63.9% 54.6% 8.09% 1.02 0.85 1.17
ACD ALLIANCE DATA CORPORATION LIMITED 2005/03/30 -18.2% 14.7% 7.90% -1.78 -0.81 -1.24
ENL ENALENI PHARMACEUTICALS LIMITED 2005/06/10 149.2% 103.0% 7.74% 1.37 0.69 1.45
CMO CHROMETCO LIMITED 2005/08/12 -45.4% 18.1% 7.83% -2.94 -0.40 -2.50
WLL WELLCO HEALTH LIMITED 2005/09/22 -40.1% 15.6% 7.91% -3.08 -0.39 -2.57
ACC ACC-ROSS HOLDINGS LIMITED 2006/02/16 -74.6% 12.8% 8.04% -6.48 -0.17 -5.85
WEA W G WEARNE LIMITED 2006/02/21 86.1% 58.0% 8.05% 1.35 0.67 1.48
ESR ESOR LIMITED 2006/03/14 32.0% 49.4% 8.06% 0.49 1.54 0.65
PSV PSV HOLDINGS LIMITED 2006/04/21 -12.7% 7.1% 8.09% -2.92 -0.56 -1.78
SAN SANYATI HOLDINGS LIMITED 2006/06/02 49.1% 42.6% 8.10% 0.96 0.87 1.15
TAS TASTE HOLDINGS LIMITED 2006/06/21 16.7% 27.5% 8.11% 0.31 1.64 0.61
DLG DIALOGUE GROUP HOLDINGS LIMITED 2006/09/19 41.5% 31.6% 8.06% 1.06 0.76 1.31
GDN GOODERSON LEISURE CORPORATION LTD 2006/09/26 11.9% 12.0% 8.06% 0.32 1.01 0.99
BFS BLUE FINANCIAL SERVICES LIMITED 2006/10/12 154.9% 30.4% 8.04% 4.83 0.20 5.10
MYD MYRIAD MEDICAL HOLDINGS LIMITED 2006/10/17 0.8% 4.5% 8.04% -1.63 5.88 0.17
IPS IPSA GROUP PLC 2006/10/19 43.0% 30.7% 8.04% 1.14 0.72 1.40
WKF Workforce Holdings Limited 2006/11/21 10.7% 7.8% 8.04% 0.34 0.73 1.37
CEL CELCOM GROUP LIMITED 2006/11/22 -7.3% 19.8% 8.05% -0.77 -2.72 -0.37
SIC Safic Holdings Limited 2006/11/23 64.2% 42.7% 8.05% 1.31 0.67 1.50
ATR Africa Cellular Towers Limited 2006/11/29 43.4% 33.7% 8.06% 1.05 0.78 1.29
SUL SAB&T Ubuntu Holdings Limited 2006/11/30 -20.7% 9.5% 8.06% -3.02 -0.46 -2.18
TFX Top Fix Holdings Limited 2006/12/06 55.5% 24.8% 8.07% 1.91 0.45 2.23
IFC IFCA TECHNOLOGIES LIMITED 2006/12/08 -21.4% 9.6% 8.07% -3.07 -0.45 -2.23
IMU Imuniti Holdings Limited 2006/12/12 -69.2% 25.5% 8.07% -3.02 -0.37 -2.71
RAR RARE HOLDINGS LIMITED 2007/02/23 12.2% 18.9% 8.23% 0.21 1.55 0.64
AET ALERT STEEL HOLDINGS LIMITED 2007/03/01 6.9% 26.0% 8.25% -0.05 3.76 0.27
TLM TELEMASTERS HOLDINGS LIMITED 2007/03/12 -14.6% 14.0% 8.30% -1.63 -0.96 -1.04
RLF ROLFES TECHNOLOGY HOLDINGS LIMITED 2007/05/23 15.2% 14.8% 8.60% 0.44 0.98 1.02
ANS Ansys Limited 2007/06/07 54.4% 33.9% 8.69% 1.35 0.62 1.60
IWE Interwaste Holdings Limited 2007/06/14 -21.8% 21.1% 8.74% -1.45 -0.97 -1.03
FPF Finbond Property Finance Limited 2007/06/15 -34.6% 19.6% 8.74% -2.22 -0.57 -1.77
AVERAGE 18.6% 54.3% 8.2% 0.19 2.93 0.34  
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JSE AltX - IPO POST LISTING PERFORMANCE 2-YEAR (LONG-TERM)
Issuer 
Code Issuer
Listing 
Date
2-Year 
Mean 
Return
Standard 
Deviation
2-Year 
Mean Risk-
Free Rate
Sharpe 
Ratio
Coeffient of 
Variation (CV)
CV 
Inverse
XAN XANTIUM TECHNOLOGY HOLDINGS LIMITED 2004/08/20 -9.5% 9.6% 8.30% -1.85 -1.01 -0.99
MKX MILKWORX LIMITED 2004/09/27 137.8% 191.5% 8.12% 0.68 1.39 0.72
DTP DATAPRO GROUP LIMITED 2004/10/18 5.5% 19.0% 8.03% -0.13 3.44 0.29
YBA YOMHLABA RESOURCES LIMITED 2004/11/29 -15.1% 6.7% 8.04% -3.46 -0.44 -2.26
ACH ARCH EQUITY LIMITED 2004/12/10 134.7% 103.7% 7.96% 1.22 0.77 1.30
ACD ALLIANCE DATA CORPORATION LIMITED 2005/03/30 20.6% 63.2% 7.98% 0.20 3.07 0.33
ENL ENALENI PHARMACEUTICALS LIMITED 2005/06/10 149.2% 103.0% 7.98% 1.37 0.69 1.45
CMO CHROMETCO LIMITED 2005/08/12 -47.4% 18.1% 7.96% -3.07 -0.38 -2.63
WLL WELLCO HEALTH LIMITED 2005/09/22 -59.6% 24.0% 7.99% -2.82 -0.40 -2.48
ACC ACC-ROSS HOLDINGS LIMITED 2006/02/16 -60.1% 18.4% 8.12% -3.71 -0.31 -3.27
WEA W G WEARNE LIMITED 2006/02/21 135.9% 70.2% 8.13% 1.82 0.52 1.94
ESR ESOR LIMITED 2006/03/14 127.8% 109.9% 8.18% 1.09 0.86 1.16
PSV PSV HOLDINGS LIMITED 2006/04/21 -8.0% 14.0% 8.27% -1.16 -1.74 -0.57
SAN SANYATI HOLDINGS LIMITED 2006/06/02 85.8% 54.3% 8.38% 1.43 0.63 1.58
TAS TASTE HOLDINGS LIMITED 2006/06/21 7.5% 31.1% 8.44% -0.03 4.15 0.24
DLG DIALOGUE GROUP HOLDINGS LIMITED 2006/09/19 10.2% 44.6% 8.57% 0.04 4.37 0.23
GDN GOODERSON LEISURE CORPORATION LTD 2006/09/26 5.2% 15.9% 8.57% -0.21 3.07 0.33
BFS BLUE FINANCIAL SERVICES LIMITED 2006/10/12 244.0% 105.0% 8.58% 2.24 0.43 2.32
MYD MYRIAD MEDICAL HOLDINGS LIMITED 2006/10/17 -10.9% 15.7% 8.58% -1.24 -1.44 -0.69
IPS IPSA GROUP PLC 2006/10/19 50.8% 35.9% 8.58% 1.17 0.71 1.41
WKF Workforce Holdings Limited 2006/11/21 -10.9% 31.8% 8.62% -0.61 -2.91 -0.34
CEL CELCOM GROUP LIMITED 2006/11/22 -32.0% 29.6% 8.63% -1.37 -0.92 -1.08
SIC Safic Holdings Limited 2006/11/23 63.8% 36.6% 8.29% 1.52 0.57 1.75
ATR Africa Cellular Towers Limited 2006/11/29 68.9% 55.5% 8.63% 1.09 0.81 1.24
SUL SAB&T Ubuntu Holdings Limited 2006/11/30 -18.2% 9.6% 8.48% -2.79 -0.52 -1.91
TFX Top Fix Holdings Limited 2006/12/06 12.1% 52.1% 8.63% 0.07 4.32 0.23
IFC IFCA TECHNOLOGIES LIMITED 2006/12/08 -46.1% 27.1% 8.63% -2.02 -0.59 -1.70
IMU Imuniti Holdings Limited 2006/12/12 -82.0% 22.2% 8.63% -4.09 -0.27 -3.70
RAR RARE HOLDINGS LIMITED 2007/02/23 7.6% 17.7% 8.61% -0.06 2.34 0.43
AET ALERT STEEL HOLDINGS LIMITED 2007/03/01 -13.7% 29.3% 8.61% -0.76 -2.13 -0.47
TLM TELEMASTERS HOLDINGS LIMITED 2007/03/12 -25.9% 16.5% 8.61% -2.10 -0.64 -1.57
RLF ROLFES TECHNOLOGY HOLDINGS LIMITED 2007/05/23 -17.0% 36.9% 8.65% -0.70 -2.17 -0.46
ANS Ansys Limited 2007/06/07 10.4% 58.5% 8.66% 0.03 5.61 0.18
IWE Interwaste Holdings Limited 2007/06/14 -41.8% 25.6% 8.66% -1.97 -0.61 -1.63
FPF Finbond Property Finance Limited 2007/06/15 -57.3% 26.9% 8.66% -2.45 -0.47 -2.13
AVERAGE 20.6% 73.8% 8.4% 0.17 3.58 0.28  
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(ii) JSE Main Board IPO Post Listing Performance  
 
JSE MAIN BOARD - IPO POST LISTING PERFORMANCE 30-DAY (SHORT-TERM)
Issuer 
Code Issuer
Listing 
Date
30-Day 
Mean 
Return
Standard 
Deviation
30-Day 
Mean Risk-
Free Rate
Sharpe 
Ratio
Coefficient of 
Variation (CV) CV Inverse
BCX BUSINESS CONNEXION GROUP LIMITED 2004/05/24 -3.6% 4.1% 0.22% -0.93 -1.15 -0.87
PTG PEERMONT GLOBAL LIMITED 2004/09/09 7.0% 5% 0.21% 1.39 0.70 1.44
LEW LEWIS GROUP LIMITED 2004/10/04 2.5% 5% 0.21% 0.45 2.03 0.49
SPP THE SPAR GROUP LIMITED 2004/10/18 2.4% 3% 0.21% 0.67 1.37 0.73
MOZ METOZ HOLDINGS LIMITED 2004/11/08 7.7% 8% 0.21% 0.89 1.09 0.92
MVG MVELAPHANDA GROUP LIMITED 2004/12/06 -3.4% 2% 0.20% -1.72 -0.62 -1.62
AQP AQUARIUS PLATINUM LIMITED 2004/12/08 -1.6% 6.7% 0.20% -0.26 -4.29 -0.23
CSL CONSOL LIMITED 2005/02/28 -7.9% 2.5% 0.20% -3.20 -0.32 -3.12
NCA NEW CORPCAPITAL LIMITED 2005/06/27 -2.7% 3.0% 0.20% -0.98 -1.10 -0.91
VMK VERIMARK HOLDINGS LIMITED 2005/07/11 1.4% 2.5% 0.20% 0.50 1.71 0.58
AER AMALGAMATED ELECTRONICS CORP LTD 2005/08/29 9.6% 4.8% 0.20% 1.98 0.50 2.02
MMH MIRANDA MINERAL HOLDINGS LIMITED 2005/12/19 143.4% 75.2% 0.19% 1.90 0.52 1.91
SXR SXR URANIUM ONE INC 2005/12/19 -7.4% 3.5% 0.19% -2.17 -0.47 -2.12
IFH IFA HOTELS AND RESORTS LIMITED 2006/02/27 13.5% 4.0% 0.19% 3.36 0.29 3.41
ELD ELAND PLATINUM HOLDINGS LIMITED 2006/03/29 -2.5% 4.1% 0.19% -0.66 -1.64 -0.61
WGR WITWATERSRAND CONS GOLD RESOURCES 2006/04/24 35.2% 17.6% 0.20% 1.98 0.50 2.00
ACT AFROCENTRIC INVESTMENT CORP LIMITED 2006/05/15 24.8% 39.4% 0.20% 0.62 1.59 0.63
MML METMAR LTD 2006/05/22 -6.0% 7.8% 0.20% -0.79 -1.30 -0.77
JSE JSE LIMITED 2006/06/05 -15.7% 3.4% 0.20% -4.69 -0.22 -4.63
GBG GREAT BASIN GOLD LIMITED 2006/10/27 20.3% 5.3% 0.20% 3.80 0.26 3.84
AFT AFRIMAT LIMITED 2006/11/07 5.8% 2.4% 0.20% 2.37 0.41 2.45
KIO KUMBA IRON ORE LIMITED 2006/11/20 1.9% 3.5% 0.20% 0.48 1.86 0.54
ZED ZEDER INVESTMENTS LIMITED 2006/12/01 0.4% 1.9% 0.20% 0.12 4.47 0.22
PZG Pamodzi Gold Limited 2006/12/11 -3.2% 2.0% 0.20% -1.74 -0.61 -1.64
TAL TIGER AUTOMOTIVE LIMITED 2006/12/11 -6.2% 2.4% 0.20% -2.74 -0.38 -2.65
ARQ Anooraq Resources Corporation 2006/12/19 16.9% 23.5% 0.20% 0.71 1.39 0.72
ASO AUSTRO GROUP LIMITED 2007/02/01 7.6% 3.1% 0.20% 2.36 0.41 2.42
SOH SOUTH OCEAN HOLDINGS LIMITED 2007/02/28 -7.0% 1.8% 0.20% -3.99 -0.26 -3.88
RBX RAUBEX GROUP LIMITED 2007/03/20 11.3% 8.5% 0.20% 1.31 0.75 1.34
KEL KELLY GROUP LIMITED 2007/04/03 2.0% 0.8% 0.20% 2.30 0.39 2.55
CBH COUNTRY BIRD HOLDINGS LIMITED 2007/05/03 -4.6% 2.7% 0.20% -1.78 -0.58 -1.71
EPS EASTERN PLATINUM LIMITED 2007/05/21 -16.3% 3.0% 0.20% -5.59 -0.18 -5.52
HLM HULAMIN LIMITED 2007/06/25 -10.2% 8.3% 0.21% -1.25 -0.81 -1.23
AVERAGE 6.5% 27.0% 0.2% 0.23 4.13 0.24  
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JSE MAIN BOARD - IPO POST LISTING PERFORMANCE 1 YEAR (MEDIUM-TERM)
Issuer 
Code Issuer
Listing 
Date
1-Year 
Mean 
Return
Standard 
Deviation
1-Year 
Mean Risk-
Free Rate
Sharpe 
Ratio
Coefficient of 
Variation (CV) CV Inverse
BCX BUSINESS CONNEXION GROUP LIMITED 2004/05/24 13.5% 14.4% 8.97% 0.31 1.07 0.94
PTG PEERMONT GLOBAL LIMITED 2004/09/09 40.3% 17% 8.37% 1.88 0.42 2.37
LEW LEWIS GROUP LIMITED 2004/10/04 23.8% 13% 8.29% 1.20 0.54 1.84
SPP THE SPAR GROUP LIMITED 2004/10/18 21.2% 14.0% 8.25% 0.93 0.66 1.52
MOZ METOZ HOLDINGS LIMITED 2004/11/08 33.7% 14.3% 8.29% 1.78 0.42 2.36
MVG MVELAPHANDA GROUP LIMITED 2004/12/06 -5.8% 6.9% 8.11% -2.02 -1.19 -0.84
AQP AQUARIUS PLATINUM LIMITED 2004/12/08 42.2% 37.5% 8.11% 0.91 0.89 1.12
CSL CONSOL LIMITED 2005/02/28 -0.4% 8.7% 7.96% -0.96 -21.14 -0.05
NCA NEW CORPCAPITAL LIMITED 2005/06/27 -22.2% 15.4% 7.75% -1.94 -0.69 -1.44
VMK VERIMARK HOLDINGS LIMITED 2005/07/11 18.6% 13.3% 7.77% 0.81 0.71 1.40
AER AMALGAMATED ELECTRONICS CORP LTD 2005/08/29 17.2% 14.7% 7.86% 0.63 0.86 1.17
MMH MIRANDA MINERAL HOLDINGS LIMITED 2005/12/19 184.5% 65.6% 7.98% 2.69 0.36 2.81
SXR SXR URANIUM ONE INC 2005/12/19 55.5% 42.2% 7.98% 1.12 0.76 1.31
IFH IFA HOTELS AND RESORTS LIMITED 2006/02/27 -21.5% 13.3% 8.05% -2.21 -0.62 -1.61
ELD ELAND PLATINUM HOLDINGS LIMITED 2006/03/29 25.0% 50.9% 8.07% 0.33 2.04 0.49
WGR WITWATERSRAND CONS GOLD RESOURCES 2006/04/24 36.3% 25.6% 8.09% 1.10 0.70 1.42
ACT AFROCENTRIC INVESTMENT CORP LIMITED 2006/05/15 5.2% 51.1% 8.10% -0.06 9.91 0.10
MML METMAR LTD 2006/05/22 69.9% 55.7% 8.10% 1.11 0.80 1.26
JSE JSE LIMITED 2006/06/05 95.5% 69.8% 8.10% 1.25 0.73 1.37
GBG GREAT BASIN GOLD LIMITED 2006/10/27 40.9% 25.5% 8.03% 1.29 0.62 1.60
AFT AFRIMAT LIMITED 2006/11/07 19.6% 7.1% 8.03% 1.62 0.36 2.75
KIO KUMBA IRON ORE LIMITED 2006/11/20 55.5% 43.0% 8.04% 1.10 0.77 1.29
ZED ZEDER INVESTMENTS LIMITED 2006/12/01 12.0% 5.1% 8.06% 0.77 0.42 2.36
PZG Pamodzi Gold Limited 2006/12/11 -8.0% 11.0% 8.07% -1.47 -1.37 -0.73
TAL TIGER AUTOMOTIVE LIMITED 2006/12/11 -2.9% 10.6% 8.07% -1.03 -3.66 -0.27
ARQ Anooraq Resources Corporation 2006/12/19 121.3% 84.5% 8.08% 1.34 0.70 1.44
ASO AUSTRO GROUP LIMITED 2007/02/01 58.7% 23.7% 8.16% 2.13 0.40 2.48
SOH SOUTH OCEAN HOLDINGS LIMITED 2007/02/28 -9.3% 8.8% 8.25% -1.98 -0.95 -1.05
RBX RAUBEX GROUP LIMITED 2007/03/20 80.4% 40.2% 8.27% 1.79 0.50 2.00
KEL KELLY GROUP LIMITED 2007/04/03 3.5% 8.0% 8.38% -0.61 2.33 0.43
CBH COUNTRY BIRD HOLDINGS LIMITED 2007/05/03 -6.2% 14.0% 8.49% -1.05 -2.25 -0.44
EPS EASTERN PLATINUM LIMITED 2007/05/21 -1.2% 20.8% 8.58% -0.47 -17.66 -0.06
HLM HULAMIN LIMITED 2007/06/25 -28.7% 8.7% 8.61% -4.31 -0.30 -3.32
AVERAGE 31.1% 44.4% 8.16% 0.52 1.42 0.70  
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JSE MAIN BOARD - IPO POST LISTING PERFORMANCE 2 YEARS (LONG-TERM)
Issuer 
Code Issuer
Listing 
Date
2-Year 
Mean 
Return
Standard 
Deviation
2-Year 
Mean Risk-
Free Rate
Sharpe 
Ratio
Coefficient of 
Variation CV Inverse
BCX BUSINESS CONNEXION GROUP LIMITED 2004/05/24 49.2% 45.1% 8.37% 0.91 0.92 1.09
PTG PEERMONT GLOBAL LIMITED 2004/09/09 57.7% 22.4% 8.13% 2.21 0.39 2.58
LEW LEWIS GROUP LIMITED 2004/10/04 46.6% 29.0% 8.11% 1.33 0.62 1.61
SPP THE SPAR GROUP LIMITED 2004/10/18 47.2% 29.8% 8.10% 1.31 0.63 1.58
MOZ METOZ HOLDINGS LIMITED 2004/11/08 33.7% 14.6% 8.29% 2.30 0.43 2.31
MVG MVELAPHANDA GROUP LIMITED 2004/12/06 7.2% 15.0% 8.04% -0.06 2.09 0.48
AQP AQUARIUS PLATINUM LIMITED 2004/12/08 162.3% 148.7% 8.04% 1.04 0.92 1.09
CSL CONSOL LIMITED 2005/02/28 17.2% 22.6% 8.00% 0.41 1.31 0.76
NCA NEW CORPCAPITAL LIMITED 2005/06/27 -41.6% 24.2% 7.93% -2.04 -0.58 -1.72
VMK VERIMARK HOLDINGS LIMITED 2005/07/11 -10.4% 31.0% 7.93% -0.59 -2.98 -0.34
AER AMALGAMATED ELECTRONICS CORP LTD 2005/08/29 4.6% 19.4% 7.97% -0.17 4.24 0.24
MMH MIRANDA MINERAL HOLDINGS LIMITED 2005/12/19 173.9% 51.3% 8.03% 3.23 0.30 3.39
SXR SXR URANIUM ONE INC 2005/12/19 101.6% 67.7% 7.96% 1.38 0.67 1.50
IFH IFA HOTELS AND RESORTS LIMITED 2006/02/27 -24.9% 12.4% 8.15% -2.68 -0.50 -2.02
ELD ELAND PLATINUM HOLDINGS LIMITED 2006/03/29 154.1% 165.1% 8.12% 0.88 1.07 0.93
WGR WITWATERSRAND CONS GOLD RESOURCES 2006/04/24 84.6% 58.6% 8.28% 1.30 0.69 1.45
ACT AFROCENTRIC INVESTMENT CORP LIMITED 2006/05/15 -15.6% 42.0% 8.33% -0.57 -2.69 -0.37
MML METMAR LTD 2006/05/22 133.1% 76.4% 8.34% 1.63 0.57 1.74
JSE JSE LIMITED 2006/06/05 153.2% 79.5% 8.39% 1.82 0.52 1.93
GBG GREAT BASIN GOLD LIMITED 2006/10/27 64.9% 40.7% 8.60% 1.38 0.63 1.59
AFT AFRIMAT LIMITED 2006/11/07 -1.0% 25.4% 8.61% -0.38 -24.78 -0.04
KIO KUMBA IRON ORE LIMITED 2006/11/20 97.7% 68.4% 8.62% 1.30 0.70 1.43
ZED ZEDER INVESTMENTS LIMITED 2006/12/01 2.0% 17.3% 8.63% -0.38 8.75 0.11
PZG Pamodzi Gold Limited 2006/12/11 -37.7% 34.4% 8.63% -1.35 -0.91 -1.10
TAL TIGER AUTOMOTIVE LIMITED 2006/12/11 1.6% 13.6% 8.17% -0.48 8.26 0.12
ARQ Anooraq Resources Corporation 2006/12/19 125.8% 99.8% 8.62% 1.17 0.79 1.26
ASO AUSTRO GROUP LIMITED 2007/02/01 30.0% 44.8% 8.65% 0.48 1.49 0.67
SOH SOUTH OCEAN HOLDINGS LIMITED 2007/02/28 -32.7% 28.1% 8.61% -1.47 -0.86 -1.16
RBX RAUBEX GROUP LIMITED 2007/03/20 72.0% 45.4% 8.62% 1.40 0.63 1.59
KEL KELLY GROUP LIMITED 2007/04/03 -17.1% 24.1% 8.62% -1.07 -1.41 -0.71
CBH COUNTRY BIRD HOLDINGS LIMITED 2007/05/03 -34.0% 30.0% 8.63% -1.42 -0.88 -1.14
EPS EASTERN PLATINUM LIMITED 2007/05/21 -30.9% 40.7% 8.65% -0.97 -1.32 -0.76
HLM HULAMIN LIMITED 2007/06/25 -40.9% 16.3% 8.67% -3.05 -0.40 -2.52
AVERAGE 40.4% 66.6% 8.33% 0.48 1.65 0.61  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
